Článek vyšel 18.5.2010 na serveru magazínu Europe’s World.
By ignoring Europe, the U.S. is damaging the support of its most valuable ally
The U.S. Administration is sidelining the EU in foreign relations while reaching out to former enemies like Russia. But Europe is by far the U.S.’s strongest and most useful ally. Alexandr Vondra, former Czech minister of Foreign Affairs, argues that the U.S. should tend its relationship with its old ally
Barack Obama’s election victory gave policymakers in Europe hope for a fresh start to transatlantic relations. The new U.S president had a different approach to international affairs than his predecessor, which promised well those in European capitals that still remembered the transatlantic split over Iraq in 2003 and all the efforts then needed to bridge the gulf between America and Europe. And no sooner was President Obama installed in the oval office than he received a letter from Central & Eastern European leaders urging him not to give up on a closer engagement with Europe. But now, half way through the second year of his presidency, it is clear that the „Obama effect“ is evaporating in Europe. With pictures of Obama with Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev often making the news, Europeans are beginning to question America’s real interest in the old continent. A closer look at the transatlantic map, however, reveals that Obama’s rapprochement with Russia is only part of today’s complicated Euro-Atlantic puzzle. Although it would be far-fetched to talk about another looming crisis among the NATO allies, the Iraq dispute of years past serves as a useful reminder and a point of contrast. In 2003, the question of European solidarity came to the forefront. One part of the EU, led by France and Germany, labeled by then U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney as “old Europe,” strongly opposed the invasion. The “new European” members of NATO as well as countries like Britain or Denmark stood firm beyond the U.S. as they felt it necessary to put on a show of unity with their ally. European quarrels split the transatlantic alliance. But, despite the divide, the U.S. and the EU found common ground at two NATO summits in Istanbul and Riga.
Six years on, the players on the transatlantic chessboard are in a different configuration. Barack Obama’s professional yet cold stance towards Europe stems from three factors: the pressing domestic issues he faces, his viewpoint on international relations and Europe’s inability to deliver on previous promises to the U.S.
At home, the consequences of the financial crisis took up most of Obama’s first year in office. Next came health care reform, the issue on which Obama bet all his money on in the presidential campaign. The criticism and difficulties that surrounded the passing of the health care reform bill indicates that Congress will slow down the administration’s plans in the future. The upcoming mid-term elections in November 2010 will determine the priorities of the Obama Administration for the rest of the year.
In the meantime the U.S.’s foreign agenda was put on the back burner, the administration mostly uses it as a PR tool to negotiate troubled domestic waters. America’s foreign policy is overstretched, which puts the country in a difficult global position. Obama’s ready acceptance of European offers to send additional troops to Afghanistan raised few eyebrows. Obama has pushed European willingness to increase defense spending to its limits. Instead of adding the amount of troops needed to bring the Afghan mission to a satisfactory conclusion, many European governments are thinking about pulling out of Afghanistan altogether. Because of these factors, Obama is looking for partners beyond EU borders.
The transatlantic bargain of the past whereby the U.S. protected Europe and Europe helped the U.S. to maintain global peace and stability in return, doesn’t work anymore. Instead of helping the U.S. preserve global peace and prosperity, Europe, far from contributing to global affairs, has to battle new financial fires, particularly in the Mediterranean.
Expectations that the EU would become a strong, global player accompanied the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification. The reality has turned out differently. The EU has already found out that bringing all Lisbon Treaty provisions to life will not be easy. The European External Action Service is rolling out very slowly, hindered by a fight among big European countries about who should control what in a common EU foreign policy. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton, like her boss, the EU President Herman Van Rompuy, are fighting hard for recognition from the existing institutions and mechanisms as well as from European foreign ministers.
In the end, Europe has to deal with its lack of political leadership in the global arena. Those expected to be frontrunners, like Nicolas Sarkozy or Angela Merkel, spend 90% of their time on issues that are not related to European foreign policy. The eurozone has been hit by the sovereign-debt crisis, which has posed a great threat. The European division between “old” and “new” is no longer relevant. Of course, disagreements on foreign policy still exist. But now, the more important divide stretches between the Europe’s north and south, Greece and Portugal being the misfortunate leaders of the latter. Europe is undergoing a difficult test of internal solidarity and responsibility. Will the states of the European “North” show more solidarity in bailing out their southern partners? Or will the southern countries show more responsibility in performing a strict fiscal discipline and boosting their labor productivity? If they both fail, Europe will be destined to its contraction instead of enlargement.
Russia, another key player on the Euro-Atlantic map is closely monitoring developments in relations between the north and south of Europe. Throughout the 1990s, Russia as a successor state of the dissolved Soviet empire was on defensive. Most of the time, it had to respond to the initiatives proposed by the U.S. or Europe who set the agenda. The situation has changed in the last few years. Europe has cleared the way for an assertive and pro-active Russia. A Russia, which is active in submitting proposals like the new European security organisation or promoting its national interests in its most immediate neighborhood through diplomatic, economic and military means.
It is true that the Obama Administration has initiated a debate on the need to retune relations with Russia. And it is also true that that Russia is not an enemy anymore. The U. S. and Europe have many common interests with Russia. And, Russia, like the U.S. and the EU, has to contend with ambitious rise of China in global trade. Russia, like the US and the EU, has been severely threatened by Islamic radicalism and international terrorism. And it has had to find a way of managing the nuclear stockpiles left over from the Cold War.
However, if world leaders press the reset button on relations with Russia, they will not erase any memory. And memory is not just about the distant past. We should not omit the many disturbing tendencies present in the Russia of today. Russia still claims a right to have a sphere of influence around its borders, but this conflicts with its commitments in the Paris Charter of the OSCE. As the war in Georgia demonstrated in August 2008 Russia is still capable of invading its neighbors. The new Russian military doctrine sees NATO as a danger. Russia is increasing its defense spending and some of its modernisation programs are consonant with a more assertive or even aggressive approach to its near neighbors. And last but not least – Russia is willing to use its energy resources to blackmail vulnerable European countries.
America and Europe still have common interests, shared values and democratic systems. Despite the changes of the last twenty years Russia cannot offer these values to the U.S. Although more democratic than before, the Russian state is still governed by practices that are incompatible with the liberal concept of a democracy; censorship is alive and well in Russia and rule of law is weak. Increasingly, the Russian concept of democracy has been adopted by Russia’s neighbors. The recent changes in Ukraine best illustrate this trend. It seems that political stability is becoming more valuable than democratic reform.
This is not the moment when the U.S. should be losing interest in the old continent. The weakening of the transatlantic link would come at a great cost. The underlying theme of the U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War was to keep Europe free, secure and integrated. Throughout the 1990s this premise drove most American foreign policy actions that concerned Europe. After NATO’s 2004 enlargement and after the EU took on a leading role in the aftermath of conflicts that had taken place in the NATO/EU neighborhood, the U.S. and Europe lost several joint projects that could have kept the U.S. actively engaged in this part of the world. The deployment of a European missile defense site, proposed by the Bush Administration, has been scrapped and replaced by general co-operation plans that won’t materialize any time soon. The debate on NATO’s new strategic concept showed that U.S. policy towards Europe is a source of lingering bitterness. The debate showed that trust between the allies is weakening, and new members of NATO have called for reaffirmation of collective defense provisions.
We should also avoid illusions when it comes to arms control. We still need to keep a certain amount of nuclear armory to serve as a deterrent; further disarmament should be done only with strict reciprocity. Europe is paralyzed by is internal affairs, and should think twice before arguing for the removal of American tactical nuclear weapons. What would we do if Russians choose not to eliminate their tactical nuclear assets? Do we really believe that President Van Rompuy will be the one that holds the suitcase nuke in case of an external threat to Europe?
Until now, Obama has chosen short-term alliances of purpose to help tackle these strategic issues. Yet relying upon marriages of convenience is a double-edged sword. In the future these partnerships might turn against him.
While Americans may befrom Mars, and Europeans from Venus, they are very close to one another. Together, they represent one, albeit transatlantic system. In a leadership vacuum, where the U.S. no longer dominates the global chessboard, the only relationship that has proven to last is the one between Washington and Brussels, and not the ones between Washington and Moscow or Beijing. In the end, the Europeans are more likely than others to support Barak Obama in his global efforts. The current mission in Afghanistan or the debate on sanctions against Iran are good examples.
The transatlantic bond is the most valuable alliance in modern international relations, and the U.S. cannot prefer Europe in foreign relations to other players. It would come at great cost.